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Abstract:  
The diversion of development aid to the recipient’s military may be one explanation why aid is often 
found to be ineffective in promoting economic growth and development. Previous studies have not 
derived the causal effects of development aid on military expenditure. Using a new instrumental 
variable strategy, we examine whether bilateral development aid increases military expenditure in 
recipient countries. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the 
probability of receiving aid. The dataset includes new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient 
countries over the 1975-2012 period. While development aid has a positive effect on military 
expenditure in the full sample, the effect vanishes when we exclude outliers. However, we find that aid 
provided by coordinated market economies increases military expenditure in the full sample of recipient 
countries, even after controlling for outliers. Coordinated market economies have been found to deliver 
more government-to-government aid, which has a higher risk of capture compared to aid delivered 
through non-state development actors.  
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1. Introduction 
Donor countries provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to promote economic growth and 
development in recipient countries. Scholars disagree, however, as to whether development aid is 
effective in achieving these goals (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Dalgaard et al. 2004, Doucouliagos and 
Paldam 2008, 2011, Dreher and Langlotz 2015). It is conceivable that aid is ineffective because it is not 
used for its intended purpose, indicating that aid is fungible. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
governments in recipient countries have used development aid to rig the military. In June 2015, for 
example, The Telegraph reported “British aid billions 'subsidising' third world defense budgets.”1 Finding 
evidence on whether “aid buys guns” therefore helps to explain why aid is often found to be ineffective.  
A direct effect of diverting aid to unintended purposes such as increasing military activity is that 
the funds to execute intended development projects are missing. These absent funds are likely to 
confine the overall growth effects of development aid. More indirectly, even if development aid was 
used for the intended projects, the recipient government can use the freed-up financial resources for 
other purposes it would not have subsidized otherwise, such as military expenditure. Rising military 
expenditure, in turn, is likely to influence the country’s level of violence and conflict. While military 
expenditure can have a stabilizing effect on conflict, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) show that increasing 
military expenditure has a destabilizing effect through accelerating the risk of conflict. In a similar vein, 
Pamp et al. (2016) find that extending mid- and long-term arms imports lead to a higher likelihood of 
sparking a new intrastate conflict. An increased risk of violence and conflict may, in turn, decrease 
economic growth. Consequently, increasing military expenditure might offset, or even exceed the 
positive effects of aid, resulting in no significant impact of aid on growth at the macro-level.  
Previous studies examine correlations between aid and military expenditure and provide mixed 
evidence on the nexus between the two (Cashel-Cordo and Craig 1990, Khilji and Zampelli 1994, 
Feyzioglu et al. 1998). Two studies have advanced empirical research by using instrumental variables (IV) 
for aid (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Kono and Montinola 2012). The results show that aid increases 
military expenditure, especially in autocracies. We are sceptical, however, as to whether these studies' 
IVs are excludable and therefore do not believe that their evidence reflects the causal effect of aid on 
military expenditure. 
We apply a new instrumental variable for aid that has been proposed by Dreher and Langlotz 
(2015) in their study of aid and growth. More specifically, we use the interaction of donor government 
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11654852/British-aid-billions-subsidising-third-world-
defence-budgets.html (accessed on December 7, 2015).  
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fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid as an IV. Whereas donor government 
fractionalization introduces variation over time, the recipient country’s probability of receiving aid 
provides cross-country variation. The interaction term consequently varies across both time and 
recipient countries. To the extent that donor government fractionalization affects bilateral aid through 
its effects on total government spending and thus through the overall aid budget, it has been found to 
be a powerful IV (Dreher and Langlotz 2015). We use the resulting excludable IV to identify the causal 
effects of development aid on military expenditure in recipient countries. Finding an effect of ODA on 
military expenditure would provide evidence for development aid being shifted to purposes other than 
those intended. Since military aid is not reportable as ODA, ODA should by definition not subsidize the 
recipient country’s military. The study thus elaborates on whether aid is fungible rather than 
investigating the relationship between military aid and military expenditure. Analysing the fungibility of 
aid implies a focus on development aid, which is given with explicitly non-military purposes.2 In fact, 
data on military aid are only available for the United States, but not for the other donor countries we 
examine. We thus control for US military aid to avoid omitted variable bias when estimating the effect 
of ODA on military expenditure. 
We proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses previous studies on the effect of aid on military 
expenditure. Section 3 describes the data and identification strategy, while Section 4 presents the main 
results. We discuss robustness tests and heterogeneous effects in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Previous studies on aid and military expenditure 
ODA aims to promote development in recipient countries and officially excludes funds meant to arm 
recipient countries. One question, however, is to what extent ODA is fungible. Scholars investigate 
whether governments in recipient countries use ODA on projects other than those the transfers were 
originally intended for.3 One example for the fungibility of aid is to divert development aid to the 
military. Some previous studies examined whether increasing development aid gives rise to higher 
military expenditure. Those studies differ regarding the type of data (cross-sectional or panel data 
versus data for individual countries) and regarding the identification strategy (correlations versus 
attempts to identify causal effects). 
                                                          
2
 On the relationship between military and non-military aid see, for example, Deger and Sen (1991). 
3
 For a broader discussion on fungibility see, for instance, Van de Sijpe (2013a, 2013b) and Morrissey (2015). For 
single-country studies see Pack and Pack (1990, 1993), Van de Walle and Mu (2007), and Wagstaff (2011) among 
others. Empirical evidence on both cross- and single-country studies is mixed. 
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Cross-sectional and panel data studies elaborating on correlations between aid and military 
expenditure do not suggest that aid and military expenditure are positively associated. Cashel-Cordo 
and Craig (1990) disentangle how different types of aid (e.g., loans and grants, bilateral and multilateral 
aid) are correlated with non-defence and defence public expenditure in a dataset of 46 less developed 
countries over the 1975-1980 period. Defence expenditure is not correlated with highly conditional IMF 
disbursements, DAC bilateral ODA loan disbursements, DAC bilateral ODA grants, and local currency 
disbursements, and negatively correlated with low conditional IMF disbursements and IMF commodity 
disbursements. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) examine how aid correlates with budget composition in recipient 
countries by using panel data for 38 developing countries over the 1971-1990 period. They use different 
types of government expenditure such as spending on defence (as a share of GDP) as dependent 
variables. The most important explanatory variables are the share of net disbursements of total foreign 
aid and net disbursements of foreign aid to individual sectors such as education or health (both 
measured as a share of GDP). The results do not show that more aid is associated with higher military 
expenditure. 
On the contrary, studies focussing on individual countries show that US aid, in particular, is 
correlated with military expenditure in recipient countries. For example, US aid to Israel is used to 
increase military expenditure (McGuire 1982 and 1987) and US aid to Pakistan is used for higher military 
and non-military expenditure (Khilji and Zampelli 1991). However, the previous studies by McGuire 
(1982 and 1987) and Khilji and Zampelli (1991) are based on very small samples. By using a larger sample 
of eight major recipient countries over the 1972-1987 period Khilji and Zampelli (1994) arrive at the 
same conclusion, namely that US aid is highly fungible and positively correlated to a large extent with 
military expenditure.4 
There are several reasons why aid should be endogenous with respect to military expenditure. 
Endogeneity is likely to result from reversed causality and omitted variable bias. Firstly, causality can be 
reversed as donor countries observe how recipient countries develop. When a recipient country 
increases military expenditure, donor countries may well believe that the recipient country will threaten 
other countries or repress its own people. As a result, donor countries will decrease aid to the individual 
                                                          
4
 Dube and Naidu (2016) focus on the effects of US military assistance in Colombia rather than looking at ODA. The 
authors therefore examine the direct effects of aid intended to support the military of the recipient country. The 
results indicate that paramilitary attacks increase in the course of more US military assistance, even after 
controlling for government attacks. By contrast, US military assistance has not been found to influence guerilla 
warfare. Dube and Naidu (2016) exploit variance across Colombian municipalities that have military bases and, in 
turn, receive US military aid. However, the results do not show that US aid increases counter-narcotics activities, 
despite this being the official intention of US assistance to Colombia.  
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recipient country, either to prevent the recipient from misusing the flows or to avoid encouraging 
governments that do so. Donor countries are usually democracies, and voters in donor countries are 
likely to punish (vote out of office) the domestic government for providing foreign aid to governments in 
recipient countries that do not use aid for its intended purposes. Certainly, some recipient countries that 
increase military expenditure may well do so to protect themselves in the course of a conflict, and not to 
threaten other countries or its own people. Secondly, a recipient country is likely to increase military 
expenditure when being in conflict with other countries. When the recipient country is allied with an 
individual donor country (for example, as a former colony or participating in a pact such as the US 
Defense Pact – see Leeds et al. 2002), the allied donor is likely to increase foreign aid in the course of the 
conflict. Being allied is therefore likely to influence the recipient’s military expenditure – apart from its 
effect through aid – as the recipient expects the allied donor to provide protection. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) results would thus be biased because of omitted variables that affect both military 
expenditure and development aid. 
Two studies advanced research on the nexus between aid and military expenditure by using 
instrumental variables for aid to deal with endogeneity (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Kono and Montinola 
2012). We are, however, sceptical as to whether the proposed IVs are excludable, as we will explain 
below.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) examine whether aid increases military expenditure (as a share of 
GDP) over the 1960-1999 period in 161 recipient countries. When estimating the baseline model by OLS, 
aid (as a share of GDP) does not turn out to be statistically significant. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) 
acknowledge that: “aid may be endogenous to the government’s chosen level of military spending” 
(p. 11) and use an IV that considers the extent to which donor and recipient countries are politically, 
culturally and geographically aligned. To construct the instrumental variables, they focus on bilateral aid 
outflows of the (then) five largest donor countries (Japan, the United States, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom). The political, geographic, and cultural distance of each donor from each recipient is 
measured by four variables. Political distance is proxied for by an index of UN voting affinity (Gartzke 
and Jo 2002), geographical proximity by the inverse of the distance in kilometres between the capitals of 
the donor and recipient, and cultural distance by dummy variables capturing common language and 
common principal religion. Their IV findings show that when aid (as a share of GDP) increases by one-
percentage point, military expenditure (as a share of GDP) increases by around 3.3 percent. We are 
sceptical as to whether Collier and Hoeffler (2007) identify a causal effect of aid on military expenditure 
since the exclusion restriction is likely to be violated. For instance, recipient countries that are politically, 
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culturally, and geographically close to important donor countries are likely to be supported by donor 
countries in the course of a conflict. The recipient may therefore be inclined to keep its military small 
because it expects that the allied donor country will provide protection. 
In a similar vein, Kono and Montinola (2012) examine whether aid increases military 
expenditure, especially by disentangling aid-induced effects between democratic and autocratic 
recipient countries. They argue that previous studies have not arrived at a consensus, as the effects of 
aid on military expenditure are not alike for different types of recipient governments. The authors 
propose that autocratic leaders maintain power by redistributing resources to a small group of 
influential supporters. The military is an excellent case in point because it safeguards the autocrats’ 
power and repression. By contrast, in democracies, citizens would be expected to protest against rulers 
who redistribute resources to a small group of supporters. Kono and Montinola (2012) estimate an 
error-correction model for 109 countries over the 1960-2004 period. The results show that aid increases 
military expenditure in autocratic recipient countries, but does not influence military expenditure in 
democratic ones. The effects estimated for pure democratic countries do not turn out to be statistically 
significant. Kono and Montinola (2012) also deal with the endogeneity of aid by using IVs. They use a 
measure of foreign policy similarity and higher-order moments of each endogenous explanatory variable 
as IVs, and arrive at similar results compared to their OLS findings.5 We are, however, again sceptical as 
to -whether this measure of foreign policy similarity is exogenous to the dependent variable, military 
expenditure, for the very same reason as for Collier and Hoeffler (2007).  
3. Method and data 
Our baseline panel data model at the recipient-year-level is:  
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡=β1𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + β3𝜂𝑖 + β4𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is recipient country 𝑖’s yearly military expenditure as a share of 
GDP. We use the new dataset on military expenditure from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), which includes data for the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipient 
countries over the 1975-2012 period.6 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) is the amount of net ODA as a share of GDP 
                                                          
5
 The measure of foreign policy similarity is that of Signorino and Ritter (1999) – from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 
2000). Kono and Montinola (2012) use the Lewbel (1997) solution of including higher-order moments of each 
endogenous explanatory variable. 
6
 The new dataset is called the “SIPRI Extended Military Expenditure Database, Beta Version, 2016.” Previous 
versions of the SIPRI data included military expenditure prior to 1988 only for NATO member countries. SIPRI 
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disbursed by the 28 bilateral donors of the DAC in year 𝑡 (in year 𝑡 − 1). ODA includes those transfers i) 
that are provided by oﬃcial agencies to developing countries and multilateral institutions; ii) with the 
main objective of economic development and welfare; and iii) which have a concessional character 
reflecting that the grant element should be of at least 25 percent.  
In the baseline model, we regress military expenditure in year 𝑡 on foreign aid in year 𝑡 and 
alternatively in year 𝑡 − 1 because the timing of the effect is not clear. Moreover, since military 
spending often involves long-run contracts with arms manufacturers, we also investigate results using 
averaged data over four- and five-year periods. 7  
Following related studies examining determinants of military expenditure in developing 
countries, all regressions contain a vector of contemporaneous control variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, which considers 
the domestic economic and political environment and security threats: Polity IV democracy index 
(Marshall et al. 2010), log of constant GDP per capita (WDI), and domestic and interstate conflicts 
(UCDP/PRIO). Autocratic governments are expected to spend more on the military than democratic 
governments (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008, Nordhaus et al. 2012). For example, 
autocratic rulers may exploit the military to stay in power. In democracies, citizens are likely to support 
government spending on collective goods such as education and health care and discourage spending on 
the military. One possible reason for this is that citizens in democracies may fear that a large military will 
suppress civil liberties. Empirical evidence on the association between per capita GDP and military 
expenditure is mixed (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008, Nordhaus et al. 2012). 
Obviously, countries involved in conflicts and fearing threats are expected to have higher military 
expenditure (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008, Nordhaus et al. 2012).8 In alternative 
specifications, we include the lagged dependent variable and lagged neighboring countries’ military 
expenditure as a share of total neighboring countries’ GDP. In a robustness test we also control for log 
of population, government ideology, and gross national expenditure (as a share of GDP). Population is 
expected to have a negative effect on military expenditure because larger countries seem to inherently 
feel safer than smaller ones (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008). When explaining military 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
marks few data entries as more than usually uncertain. In a robustness test we exclude recipient countries that 
have more than one uncertain observation. Inferences do not depend on the inclusion of these countries. Smith 
and Cavatorta (2016) also use the extended SIPRI military expenditure data. 
7
 In a robustness test, we follow Collier and Hoeffler (2007) in using averaged, rather than yearly data. We compare 
both four-year and five-year averages. Inferences of the main results do not change when using four- and five-year 
averages and excluding the most outstanding outlier, Liberia. 
8
 Aid may also increase the likelihood of conflict (e.g., Nunn and Qian 2014, Ahmed 2016b). The results of Ahmed 
(2016b) show, for example, that after the end of the Cold War, US aid increased the likelihood of conflict in “most 
repressive Cold War regimes.” 
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expenditure in industrialized countries, scholars also use government ideology as an explanatory 
variable (see, for example, Bove et al. 2016 and Kauder and Potrafke 2016). Rightwing governments are 
often expected to spend more on the military than leftwing governments.9 Lastly, countries having 
higher government expenditure (as a share of GDP) are also likely to spend more on the military (Gupta 
et al. 2001).10  
As in Dreher and Langlotz (2015) we follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) in using a zero-stage regression to predict bilateral aid from an IV that varies over 
recipient-donor pairs. The zero-stage regression at the recipient-donor-year-level is: 
𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = γ1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 + γ2𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + γ3𝜂𝑖,𝑗 + γ4𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 describes the bilateral amount of net ODA (as a share of GDP) from donor 𝑗 
disbursed to recipient 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗  is Dreher and Langlotz’s (2015) proposed IV, which is the 
interaction of a time-variant variable – donor government fractionalization 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 – and the recipient 
country’s probability of receiving aid 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 that varies across donor-recipient pairs. We control for the 
time-varying level of the IV by including 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 and we capture the time-invariant level by including 
donor-recipient-fixed effects 𝜂𝑖,𝑗  in equation (2). As in equation (1) 𝜏𝑡 are year-fixed effects. Following 
Dreher and Langlotz (2015), we use Beck et al.’s (2001) variable of government fractionalization, which 
measures the probability that two randomly-chosen deputies from among the parties forming the 
government represent different parties. Because government fractionalization is zero for Canada and 
the United States throughout the observation period, we use legislature fractionalization for these two 
countries. Results remain robust when excluding Canada and the United States.11 Similar to previous 
studies (Nunn and Qian 2014, Dreher and Langlotz 2015, Ahmed 2016a), the probability of receiving aid 
from donor 𝑗 is defined as ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 =
1
38
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
38
𝑦=1  where 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦 is a binary variable taking a value of 1 when 
recipient 𝑖 received a positive amount of aid from donor 𝑗 in year 𝑦. 
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 Government ideology is, however, difficult to measure in developing countries and has hardly been examined as 
an explanatory variable of military expenditure in developing countries. We include government ideology in our 
robustness tests to avoid potential omitted variable bias. 
10
 For the sources and definitions of all variables and descriptive statistics, see Appendix A. 
11
 Most of the 28 donor countries in our sample have parliamentary systems with proportional representation. 
Canada has a plurality voting system and the United States have presidential elections, which explains why donor 
government fractionalization does not vary in these two countries. Moreover, France and the United Kingdom are 
two other exceptions regarding the electoral rule, but in both countries government fractionalization varies and 
we do not replace it with legislature fractionalization. Inferences also do not change when we replace government 
fractionalization with legislature fractionalization for the United Kingdom and France. 
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From the zero-stage regression at the dyadic-level we first predict 𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 by using the 
exogenous variation of the dyadic instrument. We then aggregate the fitted values 𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 of the zero-
stage (equation (2)) across all 28 donors, 𝑗, to compute the aggregated fitted value of aid as a share of 
GDP (𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡) at the recipient-year-level: 
𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ [γ1̂𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 + γ2̂𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + γ3̂𝜂𝑖,𝑗 + γ4̂𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡]𝑗 . (3) 
The aggregation in equation (3) is essential as we can now switch from the dyadic-data-level to 
the recipient-level, which is the relevant level for the analysis of whether aid influences military 
expenditure in recipient countries. We use 𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡 as an instrument to predict 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 in equation (1) in 
order to estimate the causal effects of aid on military expenditure.12 In this step we revert to the usual 
2SLS procedure with the only difference being that we first constructed the instrument from the 
bilateral regression equation (2).13 The dataset of our baseline specification includes 124 recipient 
countries over the 1975-2012 period.14 Standard errors are clustered at the recipient-level.  
Dreher and Langlotz (2015) explain in detail why the interaction of government fractionalization 
with the probability of receiving aid is likely to be a powerful IV. While government fractionalization is 
likely to increase government expenditure, government expenditure is likely to increase the aid budget, 
therefore increasing bilateral amounts of ODA. Roubini and Sachs (1989), Volkerink and de Haan (2001), 
Scartascini and Crain (2002), and Martin and Vanberg (2013) show that higher government 
fractionalization gives rise to higher government expenditure. This effect can be explained by logrolling, 
which is likely to occur in coalition governments during the budgeting process, as all government parties 
are interested in getting their favored projects financed (common pool problem). Higher government 
expenditure has been shown to increase aid budgets of a donor country (Round and Odedokun 2004, 
Brech and Potrafke 2014). Dreher and Fuchs’s (2011) study completes the channel from fractionalization 
to bilateral aid disbursements by showing that higher aid budgets translate into higher bilateral aid 
disbursements.15 On the other hand, the probability of receiving aid is likely to influence the extent to 
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 In analogy, we use use 𝐴𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 as an instrument to predict 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 in equation (1). 
13
 Wooldridge (2010) describes that IV estimates and standard errors are still consistently estimated when using a 
generated instrument if the condition holds that the second-stage error term is not correlated with the variables 
that we use to generate the instrument. We do, however, also test our first- and second-stage results with 
bootstrapped standard errors based on pairwise recipient country clusters. Standard errors at the zero-stage 
regression are clustered at the recipient-donor-level. 
14
 Following Dreher and Langlotz (2015), we include recipient countries that have been on at least one “DAC List of 
ODA Recipients” between 1997 and 2013. The list of the 28 donor countries and 124 recipient countries is 
reported in Appendix A, Table A3. 
15
 See Dreher and Langlotz (2015) for a detailed discussion on the choice of the IV, its excludability, and the 
channels from government fractionalization to bilateral aid. Dreher and Langlotz (2015) discuss this channel from 
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which changes in government fractionalization affect bilateral aid disbursements. Nunn and Qian (2014), 
Dreher and Langlotz (2015), and Ahmed (2016a) show that the probability of receiving aid is significantly 
correlated with the total amount of aid receipts per recipient country. 
Dreher and Langlotz’s IV approach is based on Werker et al. (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014), and 
Ahmed (2016a), who use plausibly excludable IVs by interacting a time-variant variable with a country-
variant variable.16 The recipient country’s probability of receiving aid is clearly endogenous, but the 
interaction with an exogenous variable – in our case, government fractionalization – is exogenous when 
controlling for the levels of the interaction term through year- and country-fixed effects (Nunn and Qian 
2014, Bun and Harrison 2014). We deal with the endogenous level of the interaction term (the time-
invariant probability of receiving aid) by including donor-recipient-fixed effects in the zero-stage 
regression.17 In this regard our approach differs from the studies we have criticised for their IV 
approaches relying on distance or proximity measures. While the probability of receiving aid resembles 
such a proximity measure, we capture the level of the probability by including fixed effects and we are 
left with the interaction term only.18 As in Nunn and Qian (2014) the technique resembles a difference-
in-difference approach, where we compare the effect of aid on military expenditure in regular and 
irregular recipients of aid when donor government fractionalization changes. The exclusion restriction 
would be violated if we omitted a variable that is correlated with donor government fractionalization 
and that affects military expenditure differently in regular and irregular recipient countries after having 
controlled for the covariates, the levels of the interaction term, country- and year-fixed effects. Indeed, 
military aid is likely to be affected by the instrument analogously to development aid. Since data on 
military aid is only available for the United States, we can only control for a fraction of military aid by all 
DAC donors. The results remain robust to the inclusion of military aid and the power of the instrument 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
government fractionalization to bilateral aid in more detail and provide empirical testing of the hypotheses on the 
channel. 
16
 Werker et al. (2009) examine the effect of aid disbursements from Arab donors – which are induced by changes 
in oil prices – on growth in Muslim recipient countries. Nunn and Qian (2014) identify the effects of food aid 
induced by changes in US wheat production on conflict in the recipient country, and Ahmed (2016a) investigates 
the effect of US aid induced by changes in US legislature fractionalization on repression in the recipient country. 
17
 After aggregating over all donors, we are still left with the exogenous variation introduced through the time-
varying interaction term only. The levels of the interaction term are captured by the fixed effects at the first and 
second-stage since donor government fractionalization is the same for all recipients and the probability of 
receiving aid is still perfectly multicollinear to the country-fixed effects. 
18
 In a robustness test we replace the time-invariant probability of receiving aid with a time-varying measure. In 
order to do so, we compute the probability at four-year periods. In that case we have to control for the level of the 
time-varying probability, as it is no longer captured by year-fixed effects. Results at the different stages (zero-, 
first- and second-stage) of the regression model remain robust.  
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remains high. Apart from military aid, we are not aware of other variables that are likely to violate the 
exclusion restriction.19  
Following Dreher and Langlotz (2015), we argue that our Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
is representative for the effects of overall bilateral aid provided by a broad set of donor countries to a 
broad set of recipient countries. We do not expect that aid induced by changes in donor government 
fractionalization affects military expenditure in recipient countries differently than aid in general.  
4. Main results 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the results with the OLS estimates for comparison using contemporaneous aid 
in columns (1)-(3) and lagged aid in columns (4)-(6).20 In three out of six regressions, aid is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels when estimating the panel data model by OLS (including 
country- and year-fixed effects). This result is in line with Collier and Hoeffler’s finding (2007, Table 1, 
column (3)). However, in columns (2), (3), and (5) there is a slightly negative effect, statistically 
significant at the 5- to 10-percent-level. A one-percentage point increase in the aid to GDP ratio is 
associated with a 0.011-0.015-percentage point decrease in the share of military expenditures to GDP. 
For the average country in our sample this represents a change in military expenditure of less than one 
percent. Economically speaking, the OLS findings point to a zero and if at all to a negative effect of aid 
on military spending, which is negligibly small.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates of the instrumented aid variable of the 
second-stage, Panel C provides the reduced form estimates, and Panel D presents the first-stage results. 
Before turning to the second-stage results at the recipient-level, it is important to note that the bilateral 
instrument is statistically significant at the 1-percent-level in the bilateral zero-stage regression. A 
change of donor government fractionalization from 0 to 1 gives rise to an increase of 0.20-percentage 
points in bilateral aid (as a share of GDP) in regular recipient countries. The effect reduces to 0.1-
percentage points for recipient countries that receive positive amounts of aid in only 50 percent of the 
years. With an average bilateral aid to GDP ratio of 0.14 percent the effect is large. We aggregate the 
                                                          
19
 See Dreher and Langlotz (2015) for a detailed discussion on potential channels that could violate the exclusion 
restriction. Despite having another dependent variable, the tested channels of trade and economic freedom are 
also relevant in our case. If changes in donor fractionalization affected military spending in the recipient country 
through those channels as well – with a differential effect according to the recipient’s probability of receiving aid – 
our exclusion restriction would be violated. Dreher and Langlotz (2015) do not find evidence for such an impact 
through the tested channels. 
20
 We do not show the covariates in the tables in order to reduce clutter. Full regression results for our main 
specifications (Table 1) are presented in Appendix B (Table B9 and B10).  
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fitted bilateral aid to GDP over all donors and use this exogenous source of variation to predict the 
causal effect of aid on military expenditure in Table 1, Panel B. The aid variable is statistically significant 
at the 5-percent-level in all six specifications. The IV results indicate that aid increases military 
expenditure. The coefficient estimate varies between 0.05 and 0.24, generally with smaller effects when 
aid is lagged by one year. For the average recipient country, a one-percentage point increase in the aid 
to GDP ratio amounts to a maximum increase in military expenditure by 8 percent (Table 1, Panel B, 
column 1). Put differently, a one standard deviation change in aid as a share of GDP gives rise to about 
40 percent of a standard deviation change in military expenditure as a share of GDP. However, a one-
percentage point increase in aid to GDP occurs only in about 14 percent of the cases in our sample and 
the average yearly change is 0.1-percentage points. This points to a rather small effect of aid on military 
expenditure in the overall sample.  
The reduced form estimates in Panel C show that our constructed instrument (Fitted Aid/GDP) 
has a significantly positive effect on military spending in all columns of Table 1. Moreover, the results of 
the first-stage and the diagnostic tests indicate that this IV is strong (Panel D). The Kleibergen-Paap first-
stage F-statistics are clearly above Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule-of-thumb threshold of ten. The 
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic rejects the Null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified.  
Interestingly, the partial leverage plot in Figure 1 shows that the results in Panel B are likely to 
be driven by one major outlying country, which is Liberia. Over the 1975-2012 period Liberia has 
experienced many years of violence during its first (1989-1997) and second civil war (1999-2003). 
Moreover, bilateral aid disbursements have been volatile in Liberia. In 1994, for instance, Liberia spent 
about 30 percent of its GDP on the military with its aid to GDP ratio amounting to 27 percent in the 
same year (for a more detailed discussion on the outlying countries see Appendix C: Case studies on 
Liberia and Israel). We therefore run the baseline regressions excluding Liberia. The coefficient 
estimates of development aid remain positive in all columns, but lack statistical significance. Table 2 
shows the results of the same specifications as in Table 1 when excluding Liberia. The first-stage 
coefficients remain similar to those in Table 1 and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics remain large. When 
excluding Liberia we find no evidence that aid affects military expenditure in the overall sample.  
14 
 
Figure 1: ODA/GDP and military expenditure/GDP, Table 1, Panel B, column 1 
 
5. Robustness 
In a first robustness test, we replace ODA with a measure of total flows consisting of ODA and Other 
Official Flows (OOF).21 Contrary to ODA, OOF also includes ﬂows by the oﬃcial sector with a grant 
element of less than 25 percent, or ﬂows that are not primarily aimed at development. Table B1 in 
Appendix B shows that the results remain robust to the inclusion of OOF.22 F-statistics clearly remain 
above the critical value of ten in all specifications. The effects in Table B1 are similar to those reported in 
Table 1 when using ODA only. Similarly to the results in Table 1, we find that Liberia significantly drives 
the positive effects. Excluding Liberia from the regression analysis renders the coefficient of aid to lack 
statistical significance as in Table 2. 
 In Table B2 we add log of population, gross national expenditure/GDP, and government ideology 
as additional covariates. Since the major outlying observations (Liberia 1975, 1976, and 1994) are not 
included in these specifications because of missing values in the additional covariates, the coefficients of 
                                                          
21
 In order to predict the total flows (ODA+OOF) in the first-stage regression, we replace the probability of 
receiving ODA with the probability of receiving either ODA and/or OOF.  
22
 Results for arms imports (Table B5) remain robust to using total flows (ODA+OOF) as an explanatory variable.  
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development aid again lack statistical significance but remain positive. We can thus not confirm that aid 
is diverted to the military.23 
In Table B3 we control for US military aid, which may be one major omitted variable. What is 
more, the exclusion restriction could be violated because our instrumental variable might also affect the 
dependent variable through military aid. Our results at the zero-, first-, and second-stage remain, 
however, robust to the results presented in Table 1. 
In another robustness test in Table B4 we replace the Polity IV democracy variable with Cheibub 
et al.’s (2010) democracy indicator as data availability differs for the two indices. The data by Cheibub et 
al. (2010) is available for more countries than we have in the sample when we use the Polity IV index, 
but does not include the years from 2009 to 2012. Results remain robust (Table B4), with the 
significantly positive effect being driven by Liberia only.24  
Finally, in Table B5 we use arms imports as an alternative dependent variable that captures the 
size of military activity in a recipient country. The OLS results point to an increasing effect of ODA on 
arms imports, significant at the 5- to 10-percent-level. However, the effect lacks statistical significance 
when using the IV approach.  
6. Heterogeneous effects 
Aid might affect military expenditure differently across recipient countries with different policies and 
institutions and across different types of donors. The degree to which aid is fungible and the need to 
subsidize the military might depend on recipient and donor countries‘ characteristics. We therefore 
investigate whether the effect of development aid on military expenditure differs in democracies versus 
autocracies, corrupt versus less corrupt countries, conflict-ridden versus peaceful countries, low versus 
middle and high income countries, and across different types of donor countries.  
 
6.1 Political institutions 
Kono and Montinola (2012) argue that foreign aid increases military expenditure in autocratic recipient 
countries. Descriptive statistics indicate that the share of military expenditure to GDP is almost twice as 
large in autocratic compared to democratic countries over the 1975-2012 period in our sample of 124 
                                                          
23
 Table B11 includes full regressions of the IV results when including additional covariates. 
24
 Results also remain robust when we use Rode and Bjørnskov’s (2016) extended dataset including Cheibub et al.’s 
(2010) democracy indicator for the years from 2009 to 2012.  
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recipient countries.25 To investigate heterogeneous effects of aid on military expenditure in democracies 
and non-democracies, we estimate our models for democracies and non-democracies separately (Table 
B6a and B6b) – as measured by the Polity IV index.26 At first glance, our results seem to confirm Kono 
and Montinola's (2012) findings. While we mainly find no significant effects (and, if significant, negative 
effects) in the democratic country sub-sample, the effects turn significantly positive in the non-
democratic country sub-sample. When we instead only include autocratic countries with a Polity IV 
index of smaller than or equal to -6 rather than including both, autocratic and so-called anocracies, the 
coefficient estimates of development aid are positive and statistically significant in columns (1) to (4) but 
lack statistical significance in columns (5) and (6). As in the baseline specification in Table 1, the 
significantly positive effect in the non-democratic sub-sample vanishes when we exclude Liberia. 
Though, the sign of the coefficient remains positive in non-democracies. When having a closer look at 
the democratic sub-sample we again find that an individual country drives the results, namely Israel. 
When excluding Israel from the democratic sub-sample, the coefficient estimates of development aid do 
not turn out to be statistically significant.27 Consequently, we cannot confirm Kono and Montinola's 
(2012) findings.  
 
6.2 Corruption 
Following Gupta et al. (2001) corrupt recipients are likely to spend a higher share of their GDP on 
military expenditure than less corrupt countries. For example, arms imports are likely to increase when 
governments in arms-receiving countries are prone to bribes. Military affairs are usually dealt with in 
secrecy, therefore making corruption difficult to reveal (see Gupta et al. 2001 for a more detailed 
                                                          
25
 We use the proposed thresholds of the Polity IV index of larger than/equal to 6 for democratic, smaller 
than/equal to -6 for autocratic countries, and values in-between for anocracies. 
26
 Kono and Montinola (2012) use three different indices: the Polity IV index, the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) 
and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2010) measure of the winning coalition size. It is worth noting that their 
findings vary according to the choice of the index. In order to split the sample, we use the proposed thresholds of 
the Polity IV index of larger than/equal to 6 for democratic and smaller than/equal to -6 for autocratic countries. 
As there are no broadly accepted thresholds for the two other continuous measures used by Kono and Montinola 
(2012), we do not want to overemphasize these results. When splitting the sample according to the UDS measure 
at zero (larger than zero for democratic and smaller than/equal to zero for autocratic countries), we find evidence 
for a significantly positive effect in three out of six specifications in the non-democratic sub-sample even after 
excluding Liberia. When we split the sample according to a winning coalition size of larger than 0.5 for democratic 
and smaller than/equal to 0.5 for non-democratic countries, we find no significant effects, neither in non-
democracies nor in democracies when we exclude Liberia. We prefer to use the Polity IV democracy index, as it has 
a clear threshold. 
27
 In two out of six specifications, we find a positive effect, statistically significant at the 10-percent-level. The 
effect is driven by an additional recipient country: Sri Lanka. When excluding both Israel and Sri Lanka, the 
coefficient estimate of aid lacks statistical significance in all six specifications.  
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discussion). That is why both foreign and domestic firms may try to bribe governments in recipient 
countries. We can thus expect development aid to subsidize the military to a higher extent in corrupt 
countries than in less corrupt countries.  
We therefore split the sample according to the ICRG corruption index. Since there is no clear 
cut-off value for high and low corruption, we split the sample according to the median with higher 
values indicating less corruption. Countries above the median are classified as less corrupt and countries 
below the median are classified as corrupt countries. Tables B7a and B7b show significantly positive 
effects in four out of six specifications irrespective of the sub-sample. While the significant effects in 
corrupt countries vanish when excluding Liberia, the coefficient estimates of development aid remain 
positive and statistically significant in the less corrupt sub-sample after having controlled for outliers. 
However, the average corruption score in the two sub-samples differs only by one point, with a mean 
value of 2.1 for the corrupt sub-sample and 3.1 in the less corrupt sub-sample. This indicates that 
splitting the sample at the median leads to two sub-samples, which have on average rather similar 
corruption scores. We therefore tested the effect of ODA on military expenditure in countries with a 
corruption score of higher than 4 to capture less corrupt countries more clearly. As expected, the 
positive coefficient estimates lack statistical significance in this sub-sample. Taken together, we do not 
find clear evidence that aid is diverted to the military to a higher extent in corrupt recipient countries 
compared to less corrupt countries.  
 
6.3 Conflicts and low-income countries 
We have also split the sample according to whether the recipient country experiences a domestic or 
interstate conflict because countries involved in international and civil wars generally have higher 
military expenditure than countries not exposed to armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et 
al. 2008). In particular, the threat of international wars increases military expenditure according to 
Nordhaus et al. (2012). We would expect that countries involved in conflicts are more prone to divert 
aid to the military than countries at peace. Results in the two sub-samples, however, do not differ, 
suggesting that aid is not more likely to be diverted to the military in conflict-ridden countries than in 
countries at peace.  
Moreover, we investigate whether low-income compared to middle- or high-income recipient 
countries have a different likelihood in diverting aid to the military. One may well expect that high-
income countries (which are often democracies) are less likely to divert aid to the military. However, 
previous studies have arrived at different conclusions regarding the association between income and 
18 
 
military expenditure. GDP per capita is positively correlated with military expenditure in large sample 
studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Nordhaus et al. 2012), but negatively correlated in a smaller sample 
of developing countries (Dunne et al. 2008). Again, after controlling for the major outliers, the effects of 
aid on military expenditure do not differ in low- compared to middle- and high-income countries.28 
 
6.4 Donor types 
We follow Dietrich (2016) in examining heterogeneous effects across different types of donor countries. 
Donor countries have been found to differ substantially in the types of aid they give and the channels 
they use for aid delivery. Some donor countries prefer to bypass aid through non-state actors as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations, while other donor countries prefer 
government-to-government aid. Dietrich (2016) argues that the extent to which donors bypass aid 
depends on “different national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service 
delivery” (p. 65). She classifies the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and the Scandinavian countries as liberal market economies (LME).29 On the contrary, France, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium are classified as 
coordinated market economies (CME). LMEs have been found to provide much larger shares of bypass 
aid than CMEs.  
We use this distinction and split the sample at the bilateral level according to the two donor 
types. We estimate the effect of aid on military expenditure for LME and CME donors (Tables B8a and 
B8b). Our instrument remains relevant for both donor groups showing that the first stage results are not 
driven by an individual donor or by specific groups of donors. Interestingly, we find that aid from CMEs 
has a significantly positive effect on military expenditure, even after excluding Liberia and after 
controlling for the longer list of covariates from Table B2.30 The results on contemporaneous effects do 
not depend on individual observations (columns (1)-(3) in Table B8b).31 In columns (5) and (6), however, 
where we measure aid in year 𝑡 − 1, results lack statistical significance when we exclude Angola, Eritrea, 
and Liberia at the same time. The numerical meaning of the estimated effects is that when the aid to 
                                                          
28
 Results are available on request. We have used the country classification of the World Bank to split the 
recipients into low- and middle/high-income countries.  
29
 Dietrich (2016) does not include Iceland in her analysis. We include Iceland in the group of Scandinavian donors 
and thus in the liberal market economy category. 
30
 When we bootstrapped standard errors based on pairwise recipient country clusters, the effects in columns (1)-
(5) remain statistically significant at the 10-percent-level. 
31
 We also excluded Angola, Eritrea, and Oman, which are likely to be the most influential countries according to 
the partial leverage plot, and the effects still remain significantly positive.  
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GDP ratio increases by one-percentage point, military expenditure as a share of GDP increases by about 
0.15- to 0.26-percentage points in the most stringent specifications (columns (3) and (6) in Table B8b). 
For the LMEs we do not find a positive effect of aid on military expenditure, the inclusion and exclusion 
of Liberia notwithstanding. We examine whether the Scandinavian donors, who are often described as 
being good donors especially in comparison to the Anglo-American donor countries, drive the results for 
the LMEs. Results for the LME group remain robust to the exclusion of the Scandinavian donors. It is 
conceivable that aid from CME donors increases military expenditure but aid from LME donors does not 
influence military expenditure because LMEs and CMEs differ in their relative provision of bypass aid. As 
the LME donor countries are supposed to deliver higher shares of aid through non-state actors, aid is 
less likely to be captured by the government for the purpose of financing the military.  
7. Conclusion 
Many empirical studies suggest that aid is not effective, for example, in increasing economic growth or 
supporting governance (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008, 2011, Dreher and Langlotz 2015). A prime 
example is that governments in recipient countries use aid to finance military expenditure, rather than 
education, infrastructure, public health etc. Previous studies examined the extent to which development 
aid is fungible. By examining the effect of aid on military expenditure, we elaborate on whether aid is 
fungible, because subsidizing the military is not the intended purpose of ODA. Two studies advanced 
empirical research on development aid and military expenditure by employing IV approaches to deal 
with the likely endogeneity of development aid (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Kono and Montinola 2012). 
We are, however, sceptical as to whether the previous studies derived causal effects of development aid 
on military expenditure, since the IVs they used are arguably not excludable (cultural and political 
proximity between donor and recipient countries). We have therefore used a new IV strategy and new 
data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975-2012 period. The instrument is 
the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid, an IV that was 
proposed by Dreher and Langlotz (2015). 
The results indicate that development aid increases military expenditure in the full sample, at 
the 5-percent-level of significance. Inferences for the overall sample depend, however, on one outlying 
country: Liberia. When excluding Liberia, the coefficient estimates of the instrumented development aid 
variable remain positive, but do not reach statistical significance. We have also used arms imports as a 
dependent variable. When estimating the model by OLS, the results indicate that development aid and 
arms imports are positively correlated. By contrast, when estimating the model by 2SLS, development 
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aid does not turn out to be statistically significant. These results suggest that using our new IV strategy 
to identify the causal effects of development aid is useful in avoiding inferences that are likely to be 
based on biased and inconsistent estimates such as OLS estimates. 
Investigating heterogeneous effects according to autocracies and democracies corroborates the 
finding that two outliers – Liberia in the sample of non-democratic countries and Israel in the sample of 
democratic countries – drive the results. Considering our finding that including/excluding Liberia and/or 
Israel drastically changes the results, and therefore the conclusions that can be drawn, we posit that any 
study examining whether development aid influences military spending should explicitly state whether 
either of these two countries are included/excluded.  
We have split the sample by donor types as proposed by Dietrich (2016). Liberal market 
economies (LMEs, e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) have been found to provide 
much larger shares of bypass aid than coordinated market economies (CMEs, e.g., France, Germany, 
Japan). Our results show that aid provided by CMEs increases military expenditure, an effect being 
robust to excluding outlying countries. A one-percentage point increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio leads to 
about a 10 percent increase in military expenditure (share of GDP) for the average recipient country. 
When we measure aid in year 𝑡 − 1 instead of year 𝑡, the aid-induced effect is smaller and does not turn 
out to be statistically significant in some specifications. We propose that because the LME donor 
countries are supposed to deliver higher shares of aid through non-state actors, aid is less likely to be 
captured by the government for the purpose of financing the military. 
Since specific types of aid including aid through different delivery channels are likely to affect 
military expenditure in different ways, future research should investigate which individual types and 
delivery channels of aid are more likely to be linked to a diversion to the military; the implication being 
that donors should grant any of the types identified with greater caution. Scholars who examine 
whether development aid is fungible in ways other than by diversion to the recipient’s military and 
scholars examining aid effectiveness would be advised to consider specific types and delivery channels 
of aid as well as specific groups of donor countries.  
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Table 1 Main results 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level in Panel A, B and C and at the donor-
recipient-country-level in Panel D; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01).  
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP       -0.015         -0.011**       -0.011**       -0.024         -0.015*        -0.014   
           (0.014)        (0.005)        (0.005)        (0.018)        (0.008)        (0.009)   
Adj. R-squared        0.167          0.688          0.686          0.180          0.683          0.673   
Aid/GDP        0.236**        0.120**        0.082***        0.200**        0.055**        0.053** 
     (0.116)        (0.047)        (0.028)        (0.093)        (0.024)        (0.022)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        0.267**        0.134**        0.097***        0.241**        0.068**        0.069** 
     (0.129)        (0.052)        (0.034)        (0.110)        (0.029)        (0.029)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.132***        1.121***        1.191***        1.207***        1.224***        1.305***
     (0.086)        (0.094)        (0.099)        (0.085)        (0.088)        (0.079)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 59.793 61.889 58.887 66.309 67.963 65.866
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 175.144 141.646 146.255 201.296 192.043 272.038
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 4.273 3.667 3.280 4.177 4.052 3.711
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.039          0.056          0.070          0.041          0.044          0.054   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 3466 3360 2957 3282 3282 2894
No. of Countries 124 124 109 123 123 109
D. First-Stage
A. OLS
B. Second-Stage
C. Reduced Form
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Table 2 Main results: Excluding Liberia 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 
0.01).  
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.266          0.142          0.060          0.223          0.049          0.045   
     (0.229)        (0.098)        (0.070)        (0.182)        (0.041)        (0.040)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.061***        1.040***        1.137***        1.126***        1.131***        1.233***
     (0.117)        (0.136)        (0.139)        (0.120)        (0.119)        (0.111)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 34.865 33.958 30.620 38.996 39.190 36.828
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 81.979 58.453 66.682 88.635 90.045 123.850
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 17.606 21.438 16.227 17.519 17.970 14.279
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 3439 3335 2932 3258 3258 2870
No. of Countries 123 123 108 122 122 108
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Appendix A: Data source and descriptive statistics 
Table A1 Data source 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Aid/GDP ODA Net Total of all DAC donors, current prices 
(USD) divided by recipient GDP. 
OECD (2014/2015), 
Table DAC2a, WDI (2015) 
Arms imports Arms imports (trend indicator values). WDI (SIPRI) (2015) 
Corruption Corruption, annual averages (ICRG), ranges from 0 
to 6: most corrupt (0), least corrupt (6). 
ICRG (2012) 
Democracy index 
 
Democracy index: dummy 1 for democracy. Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Domestic conflict Dummy 1 for minor domestic conflict, between 25 
and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset (2015) 
Expenditure/GDP Gross national expenditure (percent of GDP). WDI (2015) 
Fitted Aid/GDP Instrumental variable, constructed from the 
bilateral zero-stage regression.  
Own construction 
Fractionalization (Frac) Probability that two deputies picked at random 
from among the government parties will be from 
different parties. 
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001) 
Interstate conflict Dummy 1 if the recipient country is involved in an 
interstate conflict. 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset (2015) 
Log GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). WDI (2015) 
Log military expenditure Log of military expenditure constant (2012) USD 
millions. 
SIPRI (2016) 
Log population Log of population total.  WDI (2014) 
Military expenditure/GDP Military expenditure (percent of GDP). SIPRI (2016) 
Military personnel Armed forces personnel, total, in millions. WDI (SIPRI) (2015) 
Neighbor ME Neighbor military expenditure as a share of total 
neighbor GDP. 
WDI (SIPRI) (2016) 
(ODA+OOF)/GDP Total official flows by country (ODA+OOF), current 
prices (USD) divided by recipient GDP. 
OECD (2015), WDI (2015) 
Government ideology (left-
wing) 
Government ideology with respect to economic 
policy: Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No 
information (0). 
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001) 
Polity IV democracy Polity IV democracy index, ranges from -10 to 10: 
Autocracies (-10 to -6); Democracies (6 to 10); 
Anocracies (-5 to 5). 
Polity IV (2015) 
Probability over all periods Probability of receiving aid from donor j within the 
whole observation period from 1975-2012. 
Own construction based 
on ODA Data from OECD 
US military aid/GDP US military aid divided by recipient GDP. US Overseas Loans and 
Grants Greenbook 
(2016) 
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Base Regression Sample Table 1 count mean sd min max 
Military expenditure/GDP 3466 3.01 3.36 0.00 34.38 
Arms imports 2234 270.80 539.56 0.00 5559.00 
Aid/GDP 3466 3.62 5.70 -0.68 99.43 
(ODA+OOF)/GDP 3466 3.76 6.08 -3.84 113.64 
Cheibub democracy  3035 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Polity IV democracy  3466 0.56 6.80 -10.00 10.00 
Log GDP per capita 3466 7.27 1.28 3.99 10.97 
Interstate conflict 3466 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Domestic conflict 3466 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor ME 3059 3.05 2.91 0.00 42.91 
Log population 3466 16.09 1.53 12.69 21.02 
Corruption, annual averages (ICRG) 2029 2.62 1.01 0.00 6.00 
Government ideology 3424 1.15 1.28 0.00 3.00 
Gross national expenditure/GDP 3329 106.59 17.53 48.39 240.48 
Note: Descriptive statistics are based on the sample of column 1, Table 1. 
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Table A3 Sample 
 
  
Recipient Countries
Albania Dominican Republic Laos Rwanda
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Saudi Arabia
Angola Egypt Lesotho Senegal
Argentina El Salvador Liberia Serbia
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Libya Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Eritrea Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Bahrain Ethiopia Madagascar Slovenia
Bangladesh Fiji Malawi South Africa
Belarus Gabon Malaysia Sri Lanka
Benin Gambia Mali Sudan
Bolivia Georgia Mauritania Swaziland
Botswana Ghana Mauritius Syria
Brazil Guatemala Mexico Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Guinea Moldova Tanzania
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Thailand
Cambodia Guyana Montenegro Timor-Leste
Cameroon Haiti Morocco Togo
Cape Verde Honduras Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago
Central African Rep. India Namibia Tunisia
Chad Indonesia Nepal Turkey
Chile Iran Nicaragua Turkmenistan
China Iraq Niger Uganda
Colombia Israel Nigeria Ukraine
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Oman United Arab Emirates
Congo, Rep. Jordan Pakistan Uruguay
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Panama Uzbekistan
Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Papua New Guinea Venezuela
Croatia Korea Paraguay Vietnam
Cuba Kosovo Peru Yemen
Cyprus Kuwait Philippines Zambia
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Qatar Zimbabwe
Donor Countries
Australia France Korea Slovak Republic
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Belgium Greece Netherlands Spain
Canada Iceland New Zealand Sweden
Czech Republic Ireland Norway Switzerland
Denmark Italy Poland United Kingdom
Finland Japan Portugal United States
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Appendix B: Additional regressions 
Table B1 ODA and OOF 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 
0.01). 
 
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.220*         0.130***        0.091***        0.186**        0.053**        0.052** 
     (0.113)        (0.048)        (0.035)        (0.089)        (0.022)        (0.020)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.004***        0.854***        0.882***        1.071***        1.090***        1.141***
     (0.112)        (0.138)        (0.151)        (0.103)        (0.096)        (0.107)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 45.272 41.201 37.571 49.993 51.819 48.548
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 79.836 38.199 34.299 108.935 130.250 112.810
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 4.688 4.841 4.126 4.409 4.251 3.838
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.030          0.028          0.042          0.036          0.039          0.050   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 3466 3360 2957 3282 3282 2894
No. of Countries 124 124 109 123 123 109
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B2 Additional covariates 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. First- and second-stage 
regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, log of population, gross national 
expenditure/GDP, party orientation, and interstate and domestic conflict. Standard errors are in parentheses 
(clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01).  
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.239          0.115          0.018          0.210          0.056          0.050   
     (0.239)        (0.122)        (0.085)        (0.204)        (0.052)        (0.052)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.005***        0.970***        1.043***        0.998***        1.013***        1.077***
     (0.109)        (0.143)        (0.166)        (0.126)        (0.122)        (0.124)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 29.984 24.021 21.076 28.777 29.622 26.728
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 85.221 46.151 39.410 62.351 68.449 75.696
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 13.326 18.884 14.722 12.643 12.941 10.968
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.001   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 3288 3199 2853 3109 3109 2779
No. of Countries 121 121 109 120 120 109
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B3 US military aid 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict, and 
US military aid/GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance 
levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.234**        0.116**        0.080***        0.197**        0.055**        0.053** 
     (0.114)        (0.046)        (0.030)        (0.094)        (0.024)        (0.022)   
US Military Aid/GDP        0.155         -0.111         -0.089          0.247         -0.024         -0.035   
     (0.338)        (0.136)        (0.119)        (0.309)        (0.100)        (0.098)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.152***        1.154***        1.212***        1.207***        1.237***        1.307***
     (0.113)        (0.129)        (0.148)        (0.103)        (0.100)        (0.107)   
Cragg-Donald F stat.       63.309         67.828         63.034         66.902         70.302         66.741   
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.      103.068         80.257         66.697        138.649        153.452        148.375   
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat.        4.886          4.242          3.845          4.854          4.692          4.298   
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.027          0.039          0.050          0.028          0.030          0.038   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations         3439           3334           2931           3257           3257           2869   
No. of Countries 122 122 107 121 121 107
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B4 Baseline with Cheibub et al.’s (2010) democracy index 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, Cheibub et al.’s democracy index, and interstate 
and domestic conflict. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance 
levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01).  
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.223*         0.142***        0.099***        0.231*         0.079**        0.078** 
     (0.130)        (0.054)        (0.037)        (0.127)        (0.035)        (0.033)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.078***        1.039***        1.107***        0.974***        0.982***        1.043***
     (0.091)        (0.101)        (0.109)        (0.128)        (0.123)        (0.134)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 52.558 51.418 48.473 50.371 51.062 49.224
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 139.685 105.659 102.160 58.188 63.710 60.527
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 6.188 5.224 4.472 8.671 8.486 7.228
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.013          0.022          0.034          0.003          0.004          0.007   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 3163 3059 2664 2983 2983 2603
No. of Countries 128 128 113 127 127 113
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B5 Arms imports 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level in; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, 
*** 0.01).  
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        7.668*         5.258**        5.543**       12.882**        5.711**        6.357** 
      (3.932) (2.556) (2.786) (6.260) (2.568) (2.714)
Adj. R-squared        0.049          0.541          0.551          0.060          0.543          0.555   
Aid/GDP 5.239 4.586 7.211 19.482 15.464 20.101
(21.695) (13.092) (24.879) (30.135) (12.513) (17.568)
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.594***        1.709***        1.398***        1.632***        1.631***        1.411***
     (0.261)        (0.254)        (0.129)        (0.294)        (0.294)        (0.102)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 215.079 209.594 78.745 229.934 229.763 110.370
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 37.355 45.142 117.267 30.863 30.713 192.504
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 5.924 4.085 23.289 6.501 6.495 23.219
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.015          0.043          0.000          0.011          0.011          0.000   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 2501 2051 1835 1988 1988 1782
No. of Countries 125 116 106 115 115 105
A. OLS
B. Second-Stage
C. First-Stage
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Table B6a Heterogeneous effects: Democratic countries 
 
 
Table B6b Heterogeneous effects: Autocratic countries 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 
0.01). Democracy is measured with Polity IV index. Countries are classified as democratic (Panel A) if the index is 
larger or equal to 6 and non-democratic countries including transition countries (index smaller to 6). 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP -2.392       -0.344*        -0.474*** -1.939        0.056          0.023   
(1.811)      (0.197)        (0.157)   (1.423)      (0.062)        (0.052)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.672***        2.362***        3.335***        1.722***        2.635***        3.877***
     (0.425)        (0.578)        (0.684)        (0.386)        (0.740)        (0.965)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 4.113 8.688 9.509 4.198 8.762 10.125
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 15.500 16.692 23.748 19.937 12.674 16.142
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 5.425 4.032 3.279 5.254 4.065 3.750
K-P LM stat. p-val.    0.020      0.045      0.070       0.022       0.044       0.053   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 1298 1271 1034 1195 1195 973
No. of Countries 74 74 61 72 72 60
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.417**        0.251**        0.181***        0.365**        0.108**        0.113** 
     (0.210)        (0.101)        (0.069)        (0.167)        (0.048)        (0.049)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.037***        1.008***        1.053***        1.098***        1.105***        1.138***
     (0.109)        (0.146)        (0.163)        (0.110)        (0.109)        (0.111)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 31.488 28.955 25.520 34.323 34.476 30.956
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 91.143 47.403 41.512 99.586 102.813 105.803
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 11.430 10.386 8.202 11.864 11.868 9.868
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.001          0.001          0.004          0.001          0.001          0.002   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 2168 2089 1923 1997 1997 1846
No. of Countries 107 106 98 105 105 97
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B7a Heterogeneous effects: Corrupt countries 
 
 
Table B7b Heterogeneous effects: Less corrupt countries 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 
0.01). Corruption is measured with the ICRG corruption index. We split the sample according to mean value of the 
index in the overall sample.  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.134*         0.076***        0.083***        0.103*         0.027          0.033   
     (0.068)        (0.026)        (0.028)        (0.056)        (0.021)        (0.023)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.301***        1.302***        1.314***        1.379***        1.403***        1.415***
     (0.150)        (0.169)        (0.172)        (0.127)        (0.117)        (0.122)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 42.856 48.418 45.529 47.420 49.206 46.278
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 75.527 59.437 58.188 117.534 143.994 133.893
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 2.921 2.501 2.290 2.765 2.648 2.479
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.087          0.114          0.130          0.096          0.104          0.115   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 1447 1397 1313 1362 1362 1282
No. of Countries 52 52 48 51 51 48
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.707*         0.202*         0.184          0.475          0.197**        0.193** 
     (0.388)        (0.117)        (0.121)        (0.339)        (0.085)        (0.091)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        0.777***        0.797***        0.951***        0.876***        0.871***        1.103***
     (0.177)        (0.183)        (0.212)        (0.204)        (0.200)        (0.218)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 7.786 7.452 7.914 10.722 10.564 12.185
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 19.353 18.899 20.058 18.412 18.947 25.554
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 10.753 10.578 9.466 11.025 11.869 10.664
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.001          0.001          0.002          0.001          0.001          0.001   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations 1940 1885 1587 1853 1853 1563
No. of Countries 72 72 61 72 72 61
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B8a Heterogeneous effects: Liberal market economies (LME), excluding Liberia 
 
 
Table B8b Heterogeneous effects: Coordinated market economies (CME), excluding Liberia 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. All first- and second-
stage regressions include as control variables: log of GDP/capita, polity, and interstate and domestic conflict. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 
0.01). Donor countries are classified as LME or CME countries according to Dietrich (2016). 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP       -0.344         -0.047         -0.155         -0.264         -0.020         -0.012   
     (0.624)        (0.267)        (0.217)        (0.478)        (0.067)        (0.061)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        0.986***        1.078***        1.241***        1.027***        1.037***        1.132***
     (0.113)        (0.182)        (0.213)        (0.118)        (0.126)        (0.134)   
Cragg-Donald F stat.       36.712         30.529         33.270         39.135         39.807         41.004   
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.       76.298         34.932         34.039         75.924         68.057         71.809   
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat.        5.762         14.736         12.923          5.821          5.861          5.872   
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.016          0.000          0.000          0.016          0.015          0.015   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations    3439      3335      2932      3258      3258      2870   
No. of Countries 123 123 108 122 122 108
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.982**        0.357**        0.260*         0.856**        0.147*         0.146*  
     (0.500)        (0.165)        (0.139)        (0.407)        (0.079)        (0.085)   
Fitted Aid/GDP        1.283***        1.337***        1.443***        1.301***        1.376***        1.498***
     (0.160)        (0.168)        (0.217)        (0.152)        (0.158)        (0.193)   
Cragg-Donald F stat.       48.604         60.352         50.046         51.463         57.144         48.953   
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.       64.230         63.651         44.113         72.748         76.206         60.376   
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat.       20.046         19.321         16.643         20.329         21.363         19.546   
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations    3439      3335      2932      3258      3258      2870   
No. of Countries 123 123 108 122 122 108
A. Second-Stage
B. First-Stage
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Table B9 Second-stage full regressions, IV 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). These are the 
full 2SLS regression results of Table 1. 
 
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.236**        0.120**        0.082***        0.200**        0.055**        0.053** 
                 (0.116)        (0.047)        (0.028)        (0.093)        (0.024)        (0.022)   
Polity IV democracy       -0.021         -0.014         -0.011         -0.023         -0.013**       -0.011*  
                 (0.026)        (0.008)        (0.008)        (0.025)        (0.006)        (0.007)   
Log GDP per capita       -0.022          0.183         -0.024         -0.273         -0.121         -0.204   
                 (0.734)        (0.271)        (0.243)        (0.679)        (0.250)        (0.278)   
Interstate conflict        1.315*         0.750          0.733          1.311*         0.735          0.739   
                 (0.713)        (0.553)        (0.549)        (0.733)        (0.552)        (0.554)   
Domestic conflict        0.528**        0.103          0.083          0.560**        0.138          0.120   
                 (0.227)        (0.096)        (0.097)        (0.242)        (0.094)        (0.097)   
Military ependiture/GDP (t-1)                       0.792***        0.779***                       0.771***        0.762***
                                (0.063)        (0.074)                       (0.064)        (0.076)   
Neighbor ME (t-1)                                      0.022                                        0.023   
                                               (0.029)                                      (0.029)   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations         3466           3360           2957           3282           3282           2894   
No. of Countries 124 124 109 123 123 109
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Table B10 Second-stage full regressions, OLS 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). These are the 
full OLS regression results of Table 1. 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP       -0.015         -0.011**       -0.011**       -0.024         -0.015*        -0.014   
                 (0.014)        (0.005)        (0.005)        (0.018)        (0.008)        (0.009)   
Polity IV democracy       -0.007         -0.006         -0.006         -0.006         -0.007         -0.006   
                 (0.022)        (0.005)        (0.005)        (0.021)        (0.005)        (0.005)   
Log GDP per capita       -1.107*        -0.381         -0.414         -1.185*        -0.409         -0.459   
                 (0.603)        (0.282)        (0.338)        (0.661)        (0.305)        (0.358)   
Interstate conflict        1.174*         0.672          0.681          1.196*         0.701          0.712   
                 (0.695)        (0.535)        (0.540)        (0.708)        (0.545)        (0.550)   
Domestic conflict        0.513**        0.105          0.088          0.507**        0.124          0.108   
                 (0.235)        (0.095)        (0.099)        (0.240)        (0.097)        (0.100)   
Military ependiture/GDP (t-1)                       0.789***        0.775***                       0.767***        0.756***
                                (0.063)        (0.074)                       (0.064)        (0.075)   
Neighbor ME (t-1)                                      0.028                                        0.030   
                                   (0.028)                                      (0.028)   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations         3466           3360           2957           3282           3282           2894   
No. of Countries          124            124            109            123            123            109   
Adjusted R-squared        0.167          0.688          0.686          0.180          0.683          0.673   
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Table B11 Additional covariates full regressions, IV 
 
Notes: Data are at the recipient-year-level. Recipient- and year-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses (clustered at the recipient-country-level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). These are the 
full regression results of Table B2. 
 
  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP        0.239          0.115          0.018          0.210          0.056          0.050   
                 (0.239)        (0.122)        (0.085)        (0.204)        (0.052)        (0.052)   
Polity IV democracy       -0.021         -0.011         -0.005         -0.024         -0.011         -0.007   
                 (0.028)        (0.010)        (0.007)        (0.028)        (0.008)        (0.008)   
Log GDP per capita       -0.169          0.222          0.098         -0.315          0.096          0.103   
                 (0.724)        (0.282)        (0.224)        (0.651)        (0.175)        (0.165)   
Log population       -1.735         -0.161          0.093         -1.892         -0.242         -0.017   
                 (1.361)        (0.445)        (0.423)        (1.311)        (0.372)        (0.410)   
Gross national expenditure/GDP        0.001         -0.000          0.007          0.005          0.005          0.004   
                 (0.026)        (0.012)        (0.009)        (0.021)        (0.006)        (0.006)   
Government ideology (left-wing)       -0.041          0.007          0.007         -0.035          0.000          0.004   
                 (0.099)        (0.032)        (0.030)        (0.094)        (0.028)        (0.033)   
Interstate conflict        1.325*         0.778          0.748          1.279*         0.718          0.734   
                 (0.746)        (0.579)        (0.565)        (0.709)        (0.525)        (0.526)   
Domestic conflict        0.568**        0.143          0.153*         0.599**        0.175*         0.167*  
                 (0.222)        (0.094)        (0.092)        (0.239)        (0.091)        (0.091)   
Military ependiture/GDP (t-1)                       0.753***        0.726***                       0.722***        0.705***
                                (0.062)        (0.066)                       (0.062)        (0.067)   
Neighbor ME (t-1)                                      0.050*                                       0.040   
                                               (0.028)                                      (0.025)   
Aid lagged? no no no yes yes yes
Lagged dependent? no yes yes no yes yes
Lagged Neighbor ME no no yes no no yes
No. of Observations    3288      3199      2853      3109      3109      2779   
No. of Countries 121 121 109 120 120 109
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Appendix C: Case studies on Liberia and Israel 
 
We now discuss the two most outstanding outliers in more detail, Liberia and Israel. Liberia has been 
considered as being a fragile state since April 1979 (see Johnston 2004, Pham 2004, and Werker and 
Beganovic 2011 for detailed case studies on Liberia). When the government decided to increase the 
price of rice in spring 1979, citizens rebelled against the government. Samuel Doe, a master sergeant of 
the Liberian army, and confederates killed the President William Tolbert. Samuel Doe was ruling Liberia 
in the 1980s. Economic development declined, political instability and violence increased. In 1989 the 
warlord, Charles Taylor, and confederates rebelled. There was conflict and civil war over the 1989-2003 
period, till the United States and Nigeria intervened. For Liberia, our dataset includes observations for 
the 1975-1988, 1991-1994, and 2004-2012 periods. There are missing values most likely because of the 
civil wars. Aid and military expenditure were strongly and positively correlated over the 1975-1988 (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.81) and 1991-1994 periods (the correlation coefficient is 0.84). By contrast, 
over the 2004-2012 period, the correlation coefficient is -0.45 (Figure 2). We are not aware of verified 
evidence proving the extent to which and the way in which rulers used ODA to increase military 
expenditure. However, aid is likely to have been diverted to the military in the 1980s under the 
government of Samuel Doe. In particular, “Doe looked further for diplomatic and other support” and 
was encouraged, for example, by left-wing intellectuals to “build closer ties with Libya and the Soviet 
bloc” (Pham 2004: 88). To prevent closer ties between Liberia and communist countries “U.S. economic 
and military assistance to Liberia between 1981 and 1985 totalled over $500 million” (Pham 2004: 89).  
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Figure 2: Correlation between ODA/GDP and military expenditure/GDP per period, Liberia 
 
Notes: r is the correlation coefficient between military expenditure and aid (both as a share of GDP) for 
the respective period.  
 
 Our second major outlying country is Israel. Israel is a developed OECD country that has been a 
democracy with recurring elections since the establishment of the modern state in 1948. The aid-to-
GDP-ratio was quite large in the 1980s, taking on the largest value of 8.2 percent in 1985 at the end of 
the first Lebanon war. At the same time, Israel spends a large share of its GDP on the military. Military 
expenditure (as a share of GDP) decreased, however, from about 30.5 percent in 1975 to about 5.7 
percent in 2012. For the 1977-2004 period, the coefficient of correlation between aid and military 
expenditure is 0.81 (Figure 3).32 For the overall sample period from 1975-2012 the correlation is, 
however, much lower (0.53), but still remarkably high. 
The most important donor country providing aid to Israel is the United States. In our sample, 
about 96 percent of the aid Israel receives is provided by the United States. In the course of the 1977 
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, US development and military aid increased to both Israel 
and Egypt, with Egypt receiving two-thirds of any aid given to Israel. In general, US military aid to Israel 
has been larger than ODA throughout the observation period. In 2004, for example, US ODA was about 
0.4 percent of Israeli GDP compared to a much higher share of US military aid, which reached about 2.1 
percent of Israeli GDP. In order to avoid increasing the official amount of military aid even further and to 
                                                          
32
 We specifically look at the 1977-2004 period since aid has been quite small before 1977 and no aid was provided 
after 2004.  
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reduce the gap between military aid and ODA, the governments might have agreed to declare military 
aid as ODA. We conjecture that a large share of the ODA provided by the United States to Israel was 
intended as military aid from the very beginning.  
 
Figure 3: Correlation between ODA/GDP and military expenditure/GDP per period, Israel 
 
Notes: r is the correlation coefficient between military expenditure and aid (both as a share of GDP) for 
the respective period.  
 
Both Israel and Liberia have been involved in conflicts for many years. We control for conflict in 
our econometric model, but may not have captured the true military threat that Liberia and Israeli face. 
Consequently, both recipient countries are likely to have diverted as many resources as possible 
(including ODA) to the military. 
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